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Abstract. This paper concerns the question of automated deduction methods for modal logic. A 
method, called Modal Resolution and inspired by Robinson’s resolution method for classical 
logics, is presented for the system K and then extended to Q, T, S4, epistemic logic, and S5. A 
completeness proof technique based on a variant of the tableau method for formulas in some 
“clausal” form is presented and applied to these systems. An algorithm implementing the method 
and including a deletion strategy using a subsumption relation is established 
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The work presented here concerns the question of automated decision methods 
for modal logic. It is specially motivated by the increasing interest in modal logic 
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in many domains of computer science. We stress here two examples. The first one 
is the logic of programs, which covers various formalisms such as Hoare’s logic, 
algorithmic logic [18], dynamic logic [ 171 or temporal logic of programs [16]. The 
second one concerns the domain of artificial intelligence where, following the pioneer 
work of J. McCarty [lo], many examples of applications of modal logic in domains 
like knowledge representation, natural language . . . have been proposed [ 14,151. 
Broadly four kinds of methods are known. The first one, called “semantic deduc- 
tion” including the popular tableau method is the wide spread method [ 12, 131; the 
second one is known as “natural deduction” whose best representative is the Centzen 
method [ 191; the third, which we call “translation deduction”, consists of mapping 
modal logic into first or second order logic and then using some corresponding 
automated method. And the fourth, in which our work is included, concerns the 
extension of classical resolution to modal logic. 
The method proposed in this paper is inspired by Robinson’s resolution method 
for classical logic, and was originally proposed by one of the authors [7,8]. But 
there were in these papers different errors both in the definition of the system and 
in the completeness proofs. The aim of the present work is to give the necessary 
corrections, to set a correct mathematical basis of the method, and apply it to modal 
systems not yet considered such as epistemic logics. In particular we shall show 
that there is a basic resolution procedure for the minimal normal system K, from 
which procedures can be defined for other modal logics. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we recall the syntax and semantics 
of modal logic, and give the normal form of formulas for which the resolution proof 
systems will be defined. In Section 2 the basic resolution system RK corresponding 
to the minimal normal system K of modal logic is introduced and proved to be 
complete. The next three sections are devoted to extensions of RK in order to deal 
with other modal systems: T (Section 3), S4 and epistemic logics (Section 4), and 
S5 (Section 5). Section 6 presents a decision algorithm for modal logics based on 
these resolution proof systems, and some improvements by means of an extension 
of the notion of subsumption to modal logics. Finally, connections with other 
resolution methods recently proposed for extending resolution to modal logic are 
presented. 
1. Prerequisites 
1.1. Normal modal systems 
We briefly recall what a normal modal (propositional) system is. 
Syntax. The set of primitive symbols is composed of 
- a set of propositional variables, 
- classical connectives: 7, A, 
_ one modal connective: q (“necessary”). 
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The formation rules are those of classical propositional calculus (CPC for short), plus 
- if A is a formula, 0 A is a formula. 
For convenience, we add the connectives v , +, -, with their usual meaning, and 
0 with the definition: 0 A = 1 q 1 A (0 is read as “possible”). 
Typing conventions: Propositional variables will be denoted by small roman letters 
~,4,r..., and formulas by capital letters A, B, C. . . 
Semantics. A (Kripke) model is a triple M = ( W, R, m), where W is a nonempty 
set of “states” (or “worlds”), R a binary relation on W (R G W x W) called an 
“accessibility relation”, and m is a function which assigns to each propositional 
variable p a subset m(p) of W. 
Given any model M, a state w E W, and a formula A, the expression “A is true 
at w in M” or “u’ satisfies A in M” (symbolically: M, wI=A) is defined in the 
following way: 
M, wI=p iff w E m(p) if p is a propositional variable, 
M, wklA iff not M, w+A, 
M,wkA/\B iff M,w+Aand M,wkB, 
M, w k 0 A iff for every W’E W such that w R w’, M, w’k A. 
According to the above definition, we have 
M, wI=O A iff there exists W’E W with w R w’ and M, w’k A. 
Let 4 be some class of models. We say that a formula A is &-valid (in symbols: 
+ I, A) iff for every M in <ti and every state w among the set of states of M, M, w k A. 
In particular, if JM is the class of all models, we say that A is valid and write “I= A”. 
These definitions can be extended in an obvious way to a set S of formulas: M k S 
iff for every A E S, MI= A and + II S iff for every A E S, + (( A. Finally, we say that 
a set S of formulas is satisJiable (respectively 4satisy’iable) iff there exists some 
model M (respectively some model M in .4) and a state w of M, such that M, w k S. 
Alternatively, we say that S has a model (respectively an &-model). If it is not the 
case, then we say that S is unsatisjiable or inconsistent. 
Axiomatics. The syntactic counterpart of the semantics we have just exposed, when 
.& is the class of all Kripke models, is the so-called deductive system “K”. K 
consists of the following axioms and inference rules schemas: 
Axioms: (1) Some set of axioms for classical propositional calculus. 
(2) (0 AAO(A+ B))+U B. 
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Inference rules : 
MP (Modus Ponens): 
A A-+B 
B ’ 
A 
Net (Necessitation): ~ 
q A’ 
We write “F~ A” if A can be deduced by means of the axioms and inference rules 
of K. Useful inference rules which can be derived from this system are the following 
ones: 
A+B A-+-B 
Net: 
q A-+ClB’ 
Pos: 
OA+O B’ 
We have the following consistency and completeness theorem. 
1.1. Theorem. A Jbrmula A is valid ifl it is provable in K. In symbols: k A if t, A. 
It is well known that various modal systems can be defined, according to what 
notion of “necessity” is to be studied. A normal system (in the sense of Kripke) is 
any extension of K, i.e. any system containing the above axioms and inference rules. 
The normal systems that will be considered in the present paper are the following 
(we write: “S’ = S u Ax” if S’ is an extension of S by means of axioms in Ax): 
Q=Ku{OA+OA}, 
T=Ku{O A-zA}, 
S4= Tu{O A+CiO A}, 
K4=Ku{ClA+OElA}, 
Q4= Qu{O A+ClO A}, 
SS=Tu{OA+00A}. 
(Another axiomatization for S5 is S4u {A--z q O A}.) 
All these systems can be given a semantic interpretation in terms of Kripke models, 
in that each of them gives a syntactic characterization of the formulas valid in a 
certain class of models. Namely, let us call respectively: Tot, Ref, Trans, R-Trans, 
T-Trans, Equiv, the classes of models where the accessibility relation is: total, 
reflexive, transitive, reflexive and transitive, total and transitive, or an equivalence 
relation. (R is total if (Vx 3~1s R y) is true). We have the following completeness 
theorem [ 121. 
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Multimodal logics 
An important extension of these systems consists in systems with many different 
modal operators. Let us call them multimodal systems. Formally we can define the 
syntax and semantics of such a system (call it S(p), where S is one of the previous 
systems and p the number of modal operators) in the following way. 
Syntax 
- The set of primitive symbols of S( p) is the union of a set of propositional variables, 
classical operators and a collection of modal operators [k] for k = 1, . . , p. 
_ The formation rules are those of Classical Propositional Calculus plus 
if A is a formula, [ k]A is a formula. 
We note (k)A for 1 [ k]lA. 
Semantics. A model for S(p) is a tuple ( W, R,, . . . , R,, m), where W and m are 
as in normal systems, and each Rk is a binary relation on W. 
The definition of the satisfaction relation is an obvious extension of the previously 
defined one, namely: 
M,wI==[k]A iff foreveryw’E W,ifwR,w’,then M, w’I=A. 
Now we have a collection of such systems according to the semantical properties 
of the relations Rk: 
l K(p) is the basic system, with no particular assumption. 
l Q(p): the RL’s are total. 
l T(p): the RL’s are reflexive. 
l S4(p): the R,‘s are reflexive and transitive. 
etc . . . 
Among those systems, one of special interest is S4( p), which is widely considered 
as the basic model for epistemic logic (knowledge logic). The idea is to consider a 
set of p agents and to interpret a formula [ i]A as “the agent i knows that A is true” 
(the operator [i] is often denoted by K,). In a similar way, a system that we would 
call Q4(p) here can be considered as a model of belief logic. We refer the reader 
to Hintikka [ll] for details and motivations. All we shall be concerned with here 
will be the formal aspects of these logics and especially the decision procedures for 
them. These systems can be axiomatized, with axioms and rules similar to those of 
usual modal logic. For instance, here is an axiom system for S4(p). 
Axiomatics: S4(p) 
Axioms : 
_ axioms for Classical Propositional Calculus, 
- (IklAA [kl(A+ B))+[klB, 
- [k]A+A, 
- [k]A+ [k][k]A. 
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Rules of inference: 
A A+B A 
MP 
B ’ 
N=(k) [kl~, 
for all k = 1,. . . , p and formulas A and B. 
1.2. Clauses-conjunctive/disjunctive normal form 
The notion of conjunctive and disjunctive normal form is crucial for the resolution 
method given in this paper. A modal formula is said to be in disjunctive normal 
,form (DNF) if it is a disjunction (perhaps with zero disjunct) of the general form 
C=L,vL,v ... vL,,vClD,vO D?v ... VU D,,vOA, 
vOA,v ... vOA,, 
where 
- each L, is a literal, 
_ each D, is in disjunctive normal form, 
_ each A, is in conjunctive normal form. 
A modal formula is in conjunctive normal form (CNF) if it is a conjunction: 
F=C,AC~A ... A C,, where each C, is in DNF. 
A formula in DNF is called a clause. Every disjunct of a clause is called an 
element. A clause with only one disjunct is called a unit-clause. A special case of a 
clause is when the set of disjuncts is empty: the symbol I will denote this “empty 
clause”, which is interpreted as the constant “false”. 
Here are some examples of formulas in CNF: 
q (pvqvO(rAt)), O((P v 9) A t) A ‘P, 
ipvO(LlpvO(qr\O r)). 
But the following are not: 
(P v (9 A r)) AS, (P v q (s A r)) A .s, q (pvq)Aoo((sv t)/lq). 
Remark. The process of normalization could certainly be performed further on with 
the 0 part of clauses. For instance, the formula 0( (p v q) A t) is certainly equivalent 
to O(p A t) v O(q A t). Our definition is the convenient one for the modal systems 
considered in this paper: it will be preserved by a certain kind of transformations. 
Notations. E[E’] denotes a formula E in which E’ occurs as a subformula. As 
usual, we shall identify a conjunction C, A C?A . AC, with the set 
(Cl,CZ,..., C,,) of its components. This is justified by the fact that trying to prove 
the inconsistency of C, A . . * A C,, is the same as proving that the set (C, , . . . , C,,) 
is inconsistent. 
For instance, the formulas of the above example are written as 
q (Pvqvo(~,t)), (O(P v 9, tl, lP)> 1~ v OK P v O(q, 0 r)). 
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Definition. The modal degree d(A) of a formula A is recursively defined as follows: 
_ if A is literal, d(A) = 0, 
_ d(Aa B)=max(d(A), d(B)) where Q is A or v, 
- d(lA) = d(A), 
- d(AA)=d(A)+l where A is c7 or 0. 
In this paper we shall always consider formulas in CNF. This is possible because 
of the following proposition. 
1.3. Proposition. There is an eflective procedure which, given any modal formula F, 
constructs a formula F’ in CNF such that kK F = F’. 
Proof. First, we eliminate all classical connectives other than A, v , 1, and we move 
negations inside so that they are immediately before propositional variables. (This 
uses Axioms 1 and 2, the definition: 10A = OTA, and the rules Net and Pos of 
K.) Then we proceed by induction on the modal degree of F. 
l If d(F) = 0, we apply some classical procedure. 
l If F is 0 F,, we can normalize F, and then use axiom 2 of K to distribute 0 
over the conjunction. 
l If F is 0 F,, let F2 be a normal form for F, ; 0 F2 is a normal form for F. 
l Otherwise, F is a classical combination of formulas which are either literals or 
formulas beginning by a modal operator. We can normalize the latter and then 
apply a classical procedure. n 
Example. Consider the formula 
1[7(0pviO(qv(rr\Op))). 
By moving negations inside, we get 
O(u 7 A O(q v (r A 0 p))). 
Now, q v (r A 0 p) is normalized in 
(9 v r) A (4 v 0 p), 
and we get finally 
O(o ‘P A o((9 v r) A (9 v 0 P))), 
which we can write as 
O(O lp, O(q v r, 9 v 0 ~1). 
Remark. Proposition 1.3 is obviously true with any normal system in place of K. 
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2. Modal resolution 
Classical resolution is a method for proving that sets of formulas in clausal form 
are inconsistent if ever they are. From a logical point of view, the method is based 
on a formal system whose main inference rule is 
where C, and C, are clauses and p a propositional variable, and which can be read: 
if two clauses D, = p v C’, and D, = lp v C2 have been proved, then compute the 
clause C, v Cz (the resolvent of D, and DJ and infer it. A set S of clauses is 
inconsistent iff the empty clause can be derived from S in this deductive system. 
In the case of modal logic, computation of resolvents is complicated by the action 
of modal operators. For instance, the following inference should also be possible: 
q (P”9) 01P 
O(lP, 9) 
From the two premises, it follows that O(lp, p v q) is true, and then we can apply 
the classical resolution rules in the context of the modal operator 0, leading to 
O(lp, p v 9,9). But then we can remark that p v q can be removed since Ll(p v q) 
is true. 
A similar example would be 
q (P”9) q lP 
09 
by applying again the classical resolution rule, but this time in the context of an 
operator 0. 
The first example can be interpreted semantically, as applying the resolution “in 
a world” where we have 1p (whose existence is given by the formula 01~) and 
also “necessarily” p v q; similarly, in the second example, we have in every accessible 
world, both 1p and p v 9, and we can derive q in each of them. But an inference like 
O(P”9) OlP 
O(-iP, 9) 
is not valid because nothing says that we have both lp and p v q in the Same world. 
Hence, the modal resolution procedure can be briefly described as applying 
classical resolution in some modal context, with some rules for combining the 
contexts recursively: 0 and 0 produce 0,O and 0 produce D, but 0 and 0 cannot 
be combined, because Up and 0 lp are consistent. 
Another phenomenon is that we must have inferences with only one premise, for 
instance, 
O(l P, P ” 9) 
O(lP,P”9,9) 
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by applying resolution in the context of 0. These considerations lead to the definition 
of the following resolution proof system RK. 
2.1. Resolution for K: the system RK 
The system RK is composed of rules for computing resolvents, simplification 
rules, and inference rules. The first ones (non-deterministically) compute resolvents, 
simplified by the simplification rules, and then inferred by the inference rules. 
2.1.1. Rules for computing resolvents 
We define two relations on clauses, 
C is a direct resolvent of A and B and C is a direct resolvent of A. 
In symbols, 
I(A, B)+C and I’(A)+C 
respectively by the following formal system. 
Axioms 
(AlI E(P, TP)+~. 
(A2) Z(I, A) + 1. 
Z-Rules 
v -rule: 
.X(A, B)+ C 
I(AvD,,BvDJ+CvD,vD, 
no-rule: 
X(A, B)+ C 
E(OA,O(B, E))-+O(B, C, E)’ 
00 -rule: 
Z(A, B)-+ C 
z‘(O A,O B)+OC’ 
r-Rules 
O-rule 1: 
,I(A, B)+ C 
T(O(A, B, F)) -+ O(A, B, C, F)’ 
O-rule 2: 
T(A) + B 
r(O(A, F)) --f O(B, A, F)’ 
v -rule: 
l-(A)+ B 
T(AvC)+BvC’ 
Cl -rule: 
I’(A)+ B 
f‘(0 A)+OB’ 
where A, B, C, D, D,, D, denote general clauses; E, F denote sets (conjunctions) 
of clauses; and (A, E) denotes the result of appending the clause A to the set E. 
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2.1.2. Simpl$ication rules 
The relation “A can be simplified in B”, denoted: A = B, is the least congruence 
relation containing: 
l (S,) 01-L, 
l (S,) IvD=D, 
l ($4 LE=L 
. (S,) AvAvD=AvD. 
It is easily seen that for every formula F, there is a unique F’ such that F = F’ 
and F’ cannot be simplified further. We call F’ the normal form of E We say that 
C is a resolvent of A and B (respectively of A) iff there is some C’ such that 
X(A, B) + C’ (respectively I’(A) + C’) and C is the normal form of C’. We write 
LX (A, B) =$ C (respectively f‘(A) =+ C) for “C is a resolvent of A and B (respectively 
of A)“. 
2.1.3. Inference rules sf RK 
(RI) g if f(C)*D, 
(R2) C’ D c2 if I(C1, C2)=3D, 
where C, Cl, C2, D are genera1 clauses. 
A deduction in RK of a clause D from a set S of clauses is a tree whose root is 
D, whose leaves are clauses of S, and every internal node C has sons A and B 
(respectively A) iff the rule R2 (respectively Rl) can be applied with premises A 
and B (respectively A) and conclusion C. The size of a deduction is the number 
of nodes of this tree. 
We say that D is an RK-consequence of S iff there is a deduction of D from S 
in RK. We note it: St,, D. These definitions and notations are extended to sets 
of consequences: if S’ is a set of clauses, SbRK S’ iff St,, D’ for every D’t S’. A 
deduction of I from S is a rqfitarion of S. 
Example. Suppose we seek for a resolvent of 0 p and O(lp v q). We get 
v -rule 
E(P,lP)-,l 
~(P,lPvq)+lvq 
q o-rule ,r(O p, O(1p v q))-O(1p v q, I v q) 
then 
thus 
x:(0 P, O(hP v q)) *O(lP v 9, q), 
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similarly, we have, 
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with O( up v q, q, I) -01% 1. Thus, E(O( lp v q, q),D 1 q) + 1. 
Then we have the following refutation of (0 p, 0( lp v q), 0 lq), 
RPP O(-iP v 4) 
R2 
O(-iP v 929) 019 
I 
Also, we could have 
~(o(oP,o(~P”qLu~q)) =3 
0c-l P> O(lP ” 4)> cl 1% O(lP ” 9>4)), 
rtoc P, O(lP” 4L q 19>O(bP” 9,9))) * L 
leading to a refutation of O(U p, 0( lp v q), 0 1 q) in two Rl steps. 
2.2. Consistemy of RK relatively to K 
In order to establish a correspondence between deduction in RK and in K, let 
us add to K the symbol “I” for “falsity”. I will be used to translate the empty 
clause. I can be seen as an abbreviation for (p A up), for some p. Also, a set of 
clauses is translated into the conjunction of its elements. 
2.1. Theorem 
(i) IfE(A, B)+ C, then kK A A B + C. 
(ii) IfI’(A C, then +K A+ C. 
(iii) [fSk,,C, then kK S+ C. 
Proof. The cases (i) and (ii) are proved by induction on the number of applications 
of the resolution rules: If E(A, B)+ C is an axiom, it is either E(p, lp) + I and 
then +K p A lp + I, or X(1, A) + A and then we have t, I A A + 1. If the last rule 
applied is a E- v -rule, by induction hypothesis (IH), k,A A B+ C; thus, 
F_.(AvD,)A(Bv&) + CvD,vD, 
by classical calculus. If it is a Z[70-rule 
l ,(OAAO(BAE)) + O(AABAE) and 
k-K O(AABAE) + O(BACAE) 
by IH and rule Pos. Similarly for the ZOO rule. If it is some f-rule, (ii) is proved 
by similar means. 
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Then (iii) is immediate by modus ponens if we remark that if A = B, then A and 
R are logically equivalent in K. n 
2.3. Completeness of‘ RK 
2.2. Theorem. Any unsatisfiable set qf’clauses is RK-refutable. 
Proof. The sketch is as follows. We define a notion of tableau for formulas in clausal 
form, which we call K-tree. Given any set S of clauses, if S is satisfiable, a model 
can be constructed from the K-tree for S; if S is unsatisfiable, an RK-refutation 
can be (effectively) constructed from it. 
2.3. Definition (Trees). We suppose known a standard definition of tree. A tree will 
be noted here as a triple (A, T, r) where A is the set of nodes, T the relation “parent 
to child”, and r the root. 
_ We say that y is a descendant of x if (x, J) is in the transitive closure of T. 
_ We say that a tree u’= (A’, T’, r’) is a subtree of u = (A, T, r) iff 
l A'c A, 
l T’S T, 
l r’zr 
l ever; leaf of u’ is a leaf of u. 
(N.B. this is not the ordinary notion of subtree.) 
_ The depth of a node w, d(w) is defined in the following way: 
l leaves have depth 0; 
l if w has children w,, . . , w,, d(w)=Max(d(w,),.. .,d(w,,))+l. 
The depth of a tree is the depth of its root. 
_ We shall sometimes say that there is an arrow from w to w’ if w’ is a child of w. 
2.4. Definition (K-trees). Let S be a set of clauses. A K-tree for S is a tree u whose 
nodes are sets of clauses, such that 
l the root of u is S itself, 
l u is constructed by performing the following operations 1 and 2 alternately until 
the end-condition holds. 
Operation 1: Repeat the following steps as long as possible: 
l choose a leaf w of u and a clause C in w of the form C, v Cl, 
l append two children to w, 
w, = w~~{C}u{C,} and w-,= w-{C}u{C,}. 
Thus at the end of Operation 1, each leaf is a set of unit clauses. 
Operation 2: For each leaf w of u, 
l if for some propositional variable p, p and lp are in w, do nothing; 
l otherwise, since w is a set of unit clauses, we can write 
w=L ,,..., L ,,,, DA ,,..., ClA,,,OP ,,..., OP,. 
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Form the following sets 
wi = Pi, A,, . . . , A,, for i= 1,. . . , q 
and append them as children of w. 
The wi’s will be called the K-projections of w. 
End-condition: Operation 2 is inapplicable. That is, every leaf of u is a set of unit 
clauses either containing some p and lp, or with no clause of the form 0 A. 
Since in Operation 1 the modal degree of the created nodes is equal to that of 
their parent, and in Operation 2 it is strictly smaller, we have the following fact. 
2.5. Fact. The algorithm for constructing the K-tree qf a set qf clauses terminates. 
2.6. Definition. In any K-tree, 
- every node to which Operation 1 has been applied is called of type 1. Others are 
of type 2 (either it is a leaf or Operation 2 has been applied to it). 
- the set of closed nodes is recursively defined as follows: 
l if some p and lp are in w, w is closed, 
l if MI is of type 1, and all its children are closed, w is closed, 
l if MI is of type 2 and some of its children is closed, w is closed. 
A K-tree is closed iff its root is. 
2.7. Lemma. Let S he a set of clauses. Jf S has a nonclosed K-tree, S has a model. 
Proof. Let u = (A, T, r) be a nonclosed K-tree for S. It can easily be seen by induction 
on the depth of u that there exists a subtree u’ of u (in the sense of Definition 2.3) 
such that 
- every node of U’ is nonclosed, 
- every node of type 1 has exactly one descendant, and 
- if w is of type 2, the children of w in U’ are exactly the children of w in U. 
Let p be the smallest equivalence relation containing the couples (w, w’) of u’ 
such that w Tw’ and w is of type 1. The equivalence class of w for this relation will 
be denoted by (w(. L e us define a tree-structure as a K-model ( W, R, m) such that t 
( W, R) is a tree. From u, we can build a tree-structure M =( W, R, m) as follows: 
W is the set of equivalence classes of u’ for p. 
for Iw( and Iw’J in W, IwI R lw’l iff IwJ f Iw’I and there are some w, in (WI and w’l 
in 11~~1 such that w, Tw:. 
IwlE m(p) iff pE w, for some w, in (WI. 
2.8. Fact. For every node w sf u’ and every A of w, M,Iwlb=A. 
Proof. By induction on the length of A. If A is a literal, it is immediate from the 
definition of m using the fact that the nodes of U’ are not closed and that if the 
propositional variable p is in a node of type 1, it belongs to all its children. 
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If A = A, v AZ, certainly w is of type 1 and A, or A, is in some descendant w’ of 
w with w p w’. Say it is A,. By Induction Hypothesis (1 H), M, 1 WI b A,. Since 1 WI = I w’] 
we are done. 
If A = OA,, there is a node w’ of type 2 in 1~ such that A E w’ and, according 
to Operation 2, a child w” of w’ such that A, E w”. By IH, M, \w”I k A, and therefore 
M,lw’lkOA,. 
Finally, if A =O A, we consider a node w’ of type 2 in lw( such that q A, E w’. 
By construction, for every child w: of w’, A, E w:. But the Iwil’s are precisely the 
worlds accessible from I w’l. Using IH we immediately get M, /w’I k 0 A,. n 
Proof of Lemma 2.7 (conclusion). As a consequence, if r is the root of the tree, we 
have that M,Ir)kS, and M is a model for S. This completes the proof of 
Lemma 2.7. n 
Example. LetS={pvr,O(qvO(( r v s), t), 0 1 s}. A K-tree for S is shown in Fig. 1. 
A model obtained from this tree is the triple ( W, R, m) such that w = { w,,, w,, w2} 
where w. is the class of nodes 
{{pv 4o(qvO((rv.~), t),O lsI,{P,u(qvO(rv.~), t),O 1q>I. 
w, is the class 
{{q v O((r v s), t), 141, {O((r v .y), t), -i qI1; 
{p~1,O(qvO((rv~),r),OlqJ type1 
type2 {p,O(qvO(rv.~),f),Olq} {l,O(qvO((rvc),f),Oly} type2 
I 
operation 2 
i 
I 
operation 2 
type 1 {y v O((rv .s), r),-l4) (y v (O((rv .y), t), 1s) type 1 
/ 
/ 
operation I operation I 
c J \ 
(q,lq) closed {O((rv .xi, 0, -iq) type 2 (Y,T) closed {o((rv s), t), 1~) type 2 
I I 
operation 2 operation 2 
4 t 
{ r v s, I) {I” s, I} 
/\ 
operation I 
/ 1 
(5 11 I.& 11 
/\ 
operation I 
J b 
( r, .y 1 ( .% 1) 
Fig. 1 
Modal resolurion in clausal form 15 
and w2 is {{rv~,t~,{r,tll. R is {(wo,w~), (w,,wJl, and m(~)={wJ, m(s)=0, 
m(r) = { w2} and m(t) = { wz}. It is very simple to check that this model satisfies the 
set of clauses S. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2 (continued). Now we turn to the second part of the proof. 
We show that if the root of a K-tree is closed, it admits an RK-refutation. The 
following lemma is the essential one in order to construct the required refutations. 
2.9. Lemma (upward lemma). 
(i) VA,, . . , AkRK B then 0 A,, . . , 0 A, kRK 0 B. 
(ii) If A,, . . , A,, Q1,. . . , QI, +KK B (r Z= 1) and the proqf uses one of the Q,‘s at 
least, then 
q A,,...,OA,,O(Q,,...,Q,) t O(B,Q,,...,Qr,E) 
for some set E of clauses if B # I, or 
q A,,...,OA,,,O(Q,,...,Q,) t 1. 
Proof. (i): Suppose we have a proof of B from A,, . . , A,. Modify this proof in 
the following way. Replace: 
_ every axiom A, by 0 Ai 
_ every occurrence of rule R2: 
Cl c2 
D 
with X(C,, C2) % D 
0 Cl 0 c2 
q D 
because -X(0 C,, q C,) + 0 D by the CiU-rule. 
- every occurrence of Rl: 5 with T(C) =+ D by fi, using the r-El-rule. 
In the following we shall use the abbreviations: 
A forA ,,..., A,,, q A forOA ,,..., CIA,, 
Q forQlr...,Qr, 06 forO(Q,,...,Q,). 
If S is a set of clauses, C and D are clauses and C E S, then given a proof of D 
from S, we say that D depends on C if the proof makes effectively use of C. 
(ii): Suppose first B # 1. The proof is by induction on the proof of B. 
- If it is just an axiom, we must have B = Q, for some j. Then, 0( B, Q, , . . . , Qr) = 
O(Q,, . . , Or). 
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- Otherwise, consider the last applied inference rule. 
Case 1: the last rule is R2. The proof is of the following form: 
+LC,YY,,Y 
B 
with I(C,, Cl) + B (a) 
Certainly at least one of the C,‘s depends on some Q,. Suppose it is C,. Again we 
have two possibilities: 
(I) AkKK C,. Then, by (i), q AtO CL. On the other hand, by IH, 
Cl A, 0 QE 0( C,, 0, E). Thence we have the proof 
y yw/ 
R2 
O(C,, 0, E) 
q c’ (by (a) and q O-rule). 
Then O(C,, B, 0, E) is O(B, 0, F) for F=(C,, E). 
(2) C’? depends upon some Q, in Q. By IH we have 
0 A,0 Q+O(C,, 0, E). (b) 
Now, from A, Qt C3 comes A, Q, C,, E t C2 (with the same proof) and, by IH, 
OA,O(C,,Q,E)tO(Cz,C,,Q,F) forsomeF. (c) 
Combining (b), (c), and the I’-O-rule we get the proof 
R1 O(C,, Cz, 05 F) 
O( B, Cl, C2, Q, F) 
which has the form O( B, 0, G). 
Case 2: the last rule is Rl. The proof is similar and left to the reader. 
Now, if B = I, the proof is nearly the same, using the simplification O(I, E) = 
1. W 
2.10. Corollary. (1) JfA,,. ..,A,,, Q,,. . , Q,t,, I (ra 1) then 
U A,,.. .,OA,,O(Q,,...,Q,)~-KKI. 
(2) Let S be a set qf’ clauses. lj’ one qf its K-projections Si is wfutable, so is S. 
Proof. (l):Casel:Atl.ThenO~t01.But~(0I,OQ)~OIbyaxioms(A2) 
and X(0 I, 0 Q) 3 I by simplification. Hence: tl A, q Qtl. 
Case 2: The proof of _I. depends upon Q. We apply the previous lemma. 
(2) is an immediate consequence of (1). n 
2.11. Lemma. In a K-tree, every closed node is refutable. 
Proof. By induction on the depth of the considered closed node w. 
- If d(w) = 0, then w is a leaf, thus some p and lp both are in w, and w is refutable 
by axiom A,. 
- Suppose the proposition holds for all w’ such that d(w’) < n and that d(w) = n. 
If w is of type 2, its children are projections, then we apply Corollary 2.10 and 
the IH. 
- If w is a node of type 1, we proceed as in classical logic: the children of w are 
w,= w-{C}u{C,} and w7= w-{C}u{C,} forsomeC=C,vC,. 
By IH there are refutations rl of w, and r2 of w2. We modify the refutation rl in 
a deduction of C, (this possibly uses the simplification rule S,), and we go on with 
r2. n 
Proof of Theorem 2.2 (conclusion). Now we prove Theorem 2.2 using Lemmas 2.7 
and 2.11 as follows: we suppose that S is unsatisfiable. By lemma 2.7, its K-tree 
must be closed. By Lemma 2.11 its root S, which is closed, is RK-refutable. n 
Example. Consider the following set of clauses. 
(I) OO(P vO1q), 
(2) 00 lP, 
(3) UciU q. 
A refutation of it will be 
(4) O(I1 lp, O(p v 0 lq, 0 1 q)j from (1) and (2), 
(5) I from (3) and (4). 
2.4. Resolution for Q 
The first extension we shall consider concerns the system Q. We recall that Q is 
K plus a characteristic axiom which can be formulated: 
Q: 0 A + 0 A (another possibility would be: 10 I). 
To this additional axiom will correspond a specific simplification rule, added to 
RK in order to obtain the resolution system RQ that is defined as follows. 
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2.12. Definition (the system RQ). It consists of the system RK plus the simplification 
rule S,:Cl I=l. 
Then we have immediately Theorem 2.13. 
2.13. Theorem. RQ is consistent relatively to Q. 
More precisely, Theorem 2.1 is correct replacing everywhere K by Q and RK by 
RQ. Especially, if SkKQ C, then to S + C. 
Let us call a model in which the accessibility relation is total a Q-model. 
2.14. Theorem. (Completeness of RQ). A set S of clauses in RQ-refutable IJ” it is 
Q-unsati.$able. 
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 2.2 for RK, with the following 
modifications. 
2.15. Definition (Q-tree). We only change the notion of projection: If S is a set of 
unit clauses, 
S=L i ,... ,L,,,UA,,...,UA,,OP I,..., OP,, 
its Q-projections are 
S;=P,,A ,,..., A, fori=l,..., q ifq>O 
S, = A,, . . , A,, if q = 0. 
And we use this new definition to build nodes in Operation 2. 
The end-condition is always “Operation 2 is inapplicable”, but now it means: 
every leaf is a set of unit clauses with some p and lp in it, or all of its formulas 
are free of modal operators. 
2.16. Lemma. If a set S sf clauses has a nonclosed Q-tree, it has a Q-model. 
Proof. We start with the tree-structure as for K. Then we add to each leaf Iuz/ an 
arrow to itself (i.e. we add ([WI, (w/) to the accessibility relation). We obtain a 
Q-model, and Fact 2.8 still holds because a nonclosed leaf of a Q-tree cannot have 
any modal operator featuring in its formulas. n 
Corresponding to Corollary 2.10 we have Lemma 2.17. 
2.17. Lemma 
(1) !f A, ,..., A,,Q, ,..., Or+1 then CIA, ,..., ElA,,OQ, ,..., OQ,tl 
(for r 22 0). 
(2) [f some projection S, ef a set of clauses S is RQ-refutable, then S is refutable. 
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Proof. (1): The only new case is when r = 0. By the same argument as in Lemma 2.9(i) 
and using the simplification rule So: 0 I = I, we get 0 A,, . . . , q A,, ~1. (2) is 
then immediate. n 
Example. Consider the following set of clauses: 
(I) q pvq, 
(2) 0 lP, 
(3) 0 19. 
An RQ-refutation of it will be 
(4) q q from (1) and (2), 
(5) I from (3) and (4). 
Remark that this set is not RK-refutable. 
In fact, RQ can be considered as the “basic” system instead of RK. In the next 
sections, we consider extensions of Q: T, Q4, S4, S5, leading to resolution systems 
RT, RQ4, RS4, RS5, which will be extension of RQ. 
3. Resolution for T 
The first extension of Q we shall consider is the system T. The resolution system 
RT we propose is an extension of RQ by a specific rule naturally related to the 
specific axiom, 0 A + A. We shall follow the same process later for S4 and an 
epistemic system. 
3.1. Definition. (771e system RT). It is RQ plus the following rule for computing 
resolvents: 
T-rule: 
E(A, B) + C 
E(OA,B)+C’ 
3.2. Theorem (consistency). RT is consistent relatively to T, i.e. Theorem 2.1 holds 
with RT instead of RK and T instead of K. 
Proof. We just have to check that the above T-rule is valid, which amounts here 
to the verification that if k,A A B+ C, then kT 0 A A B+ C. n 
Let us call a T-model one where the accessibility relation is reflexive. S is 
T-unsatisfiable if it has no T-model. 
3.3. Theorem (Completeness). A set S of clause is RT-refutable ifit is T-unsatisjiable. 
Proof. Again, we modify below the completeness proof of RK. 
3.4. Definition (T-trees). Compared to Q-trees, the changes are as follows: 
_ Clauses can be marked or unmarked. At the beginning, all formulas of S are 
unmarked. All formulas of the nodes created in Operation 2 are also unmarked. 
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- Operation 1 .for T: Repeat the following as long as possible: 
l choose a leaf w and an unmarked clause C in w such that either C = C, v C, 
orC=OC,;ifC=C,vC,,doasbefore,ifC=17C,,letw,=wu{C,},mark 
C in w,, and append w, to w. 
3.5. Lemma. lf S is a set of clauses which has a nonclosed T-tree, it has a T-model. 
Proof. First we build the tree-structure M0 = ( W, R,, m) from the T-tree for S as 
in the proof of Lemma 2.7. The required T-model is M = ( W, R, m), where R is the 
reflexive closure of R,,. By induction on the length of A we have the following fact. 
Fact. t/lwl~ W, VAE w, M,IwlbA. 
All the new we have to do now is to check that if 0 BE w, then there is some 
w’ E lwl such that B E w’. But this is immediate because Operation 1 is applied to w 
until it is the case. n 
In order to construct refutations we have the following lemmas. 
3.6. Lemma and 3.7. Corollary. Same as Lemma 2.9 and Corollary 2.10, replacing 
rtjferences to K or RK by references to T and RT. 
Proof. A careful examination of the proofs of Lemma 2.9 and Corollary 2.10 shows 
that they can be reproduced in the present context. n 
3.8. Lemma. !f’ q C E S and S u {C} is refutable, so is S itself: 
Proof. We modify any refutation of S’ = S u {C} depending on C as follows. First, 
using the I‘D-rule, we change any sequence of R, inferences performed on C, and 
leading, say, to some D in a sequence leading from q C to 0 D if D # I, or to D 
if D = I using the simplification rule S,. Otherwise D occurred as a premise of an 
Rz-rule: 
D D’ 
D” 
with Z( D, D’) + D”. 
But then, by the T-rule, I(0 D, D’) + D”, and we can go on with the rest of the 
refutation of S’. n 
Finally we have the analogue of Lemma 2.11. 
3.9. Lemma. In a T-tree, every closed node is RT-refutable. 
Proof. Same as Lemma 2.11. The only new case is when w is a node of type 1 with 
0 C E w and M’ = w u { C}. But then we apply Lemma 3.8. n 
This also completes the proof of Theorem 3.3. n 
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4. Resolution for 54 
4.1. Pure S4 
The extension of T we will consider is the system S4 where the characteristic 
axiom is 0 A-+00 A. 
4.1. Definition (7he system RS4). It is RT with the following rule replacing the 
q IO-rule: 
S4ClO-rule: 
LY(i? A, B)+C 
I(0 A, O(B, E)) + O(B, C, E) 
and the following for the q IJ-rule: 
S400-rule: 
X(0 A, B) + C 
Z(ClA,O B)+O C’ 
4.2. Theorem (Consistency). RS4 is consistent relative to S4, i.e. Theorem 2.1 holds 
with RS4 instead of RK and S4 for K. 
Proof. We have to check that if ks4 0 A A B+ C, then i--,, q A A 0( B A E) + 
0( B A C A E). This is true because 
ä ,,~AAO(B,E)+O(UAABAE). 
We have a similar analysis for the q U-rule. n 
We call any model in which the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive 
an S4-model. 
4.3. Theorem (Completeness). A set of clauses is RS4-refutable if it is S4- 
unsatisjiable. 
Proof. We proceed by the same steps as in the previous sections. 
4.4. Definition (S4-tree). The same definition as for the T-tree, with the following 
Operation 2 and end-condition. 
Operation 2: For each leaf w of U, 
l if some p and lp are in w, do nothing; 
l if there is some node w’ ancestor of w such that w G w’, do nothing; 
l otherwise, define the S4-projections of 
w={L ,,..., L,,ClA ,,..., q A,,OP ,,..., OP,} as the sets 
w,={P,,OA ,,.. .,UA,} fori=l,..., q 
and append the w,‘s, for i = 1,. . . , q as children of w. 
End-condition: “Operation 2 is inapplicable”, which means here: every leaf either 
contains some p and lp, or is included in some previous node (of type 2), or does 
not contain any formula of the form 0 P. 
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This process terminates because the modal degree of all nodes is less than or 
equal to that of S. 
4.5. Lemma. If S has a nonclosed S4-tree, it has an S4-model. 
Proof. We start with a tree-structure M, = ( W,, R,,, m,) as before and we transform 
it into a S4-model (W, R, m) as follows. 
(1) If w is a leaf such that there is some ancestor w’ of w with w c w’, then 
identify w and w’. W is the resulting set of worlds and m the corresponding truth 
function. 
(2) Let Rb be the resulting relation on W. R is the reflexive and transitive closure 
of R;,. 
Then we prove, by induction on the complexity of A, the following fact. 
Fact. VW,VAE w, M,\wll=A 
Proof. The only case to re-examine is when A =O B. The result comes from the 
following property: If El B E w, then there is a w’ in Iwl such that B E w’, and for 
every descendant w’ of w, 0 BE w’. n 
The rest of the completeness proof is similar to the one for RT. The only difference 
and the key step is the following lemma. 
4.6. Lemma. If S is a set qf clauses one S4-projection of which is S4-refutable, then 
S is S4-refutable. 
Proof. We proceed as in Lemma 2.9, using the following lemma. 
4.7. Lemma. (1) If 0 A,, . . . , q A,, t B, then B=O B’ .for some B’, or B = I, or 
q A,, . . ,ClA,~O B. 
(2) IfOA,,...,UA,,Q,,...,Q,tB, and B depends on some Qi in the proof, 
then •1 A,, . . .,17 A,,O(Q,,. . . , Q,)+O(B, Q ,,.. ., QF, E) for some set of clauses 
EifB#f,orOA ,,..., q A,,O(Q ,,..., Ql)tl. 
Proof. (1): By induction on the proof of B. We suppose B # 1. If B is some 0 Ai, 
we are done. If the last applied rule is Rl: f, then either C = 0 C’ and B = 0. B’, 
or, by IH, there is a proof of El C, and we can infer 0 B by Rl. 
Now if the last inference is 
R2 
B, Bz 
B 
with E(B1, B2) + B, 
we distinguish two cases: 
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Case 1: B, = 0 Bi, B, = 0 B;. Then the last X-rule used to establish X( B,, B,) =3 
B is either the CID-rule, and B = 0 B’, or the T-rule: 
Z(B;,O B;)+ B’ 
-X:(0 B:,U B;)+ B’ 
with B’= B. 
But we can replace this rule by a q 0-rule, apply the T-rule and get X(0 Bi, 0 B:) + 
Cl B’=Cl B. 
Case 2: at least one of the B,‘s is not in the form 0 Bi. Then, by IH, we have 
proof(s) of q B;(‘s), and we obtain a proof of 0 B by an adequate combination of 
T-rule and q O-rule. 
(2): The proof is by induction on the proof of B, and is the same as in 
Lemma 2.9(ii), except for the case where the proof of B is 
B 
In this case, by (1) we can suppose C, = 0 CJ and, by IH, 0 A, 0 @tO( C,, 0, E). 
Then by the S4-rule: 
X(C,,O C;) =+ B 
z(O(C,, 6, E), 0 C;) =j OCR C,, @, El 
and 0 A, 0 akO( B, C, , 0, E). The rest of the proof is as for RQ. n 
Using Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 we prove Theorem 4.3 correspondingly to Theorem 3.3 
for RT. n 
4.2. The multimodal system S4( p) 
All the previous resolution systems 
K(P), Q(P), UP), So. We give the 
easy. 
can be extended to the multimodal logics 
results for S4(p); the other cases are just as 
4.8. Definition (The resolution system RS4(p)). It is just as RS4, but we have to 
deal with the different modalities [k] and (k). The idea is that only modalities with 
the same index can be combined. 
Z-rules: 
[70-rule: 
~UklA, B) + C 
S’([klA, (k)(B, E)) + (k)(B, C, E) 
UC -rule: ~(LklA, B) + C 
~;([klA, [klB)+ [klC 
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T-rule: 
I(A, B)+ C 
~([klA> B) + C 
r-rules: Rules of RK, replacing 0 by [k] and 0 by (k), for any k. 
Simplification rules: 
s,: (k)l= I: 
So: [ k]l = I (not needed but useful) 
plus S2, S1, S, as before. 
4.9. Theorem. (1) RS4( p) is consistent relatively to S4( p) (in the sense of 
Theorem 2.1). 
(2) (Completeness): if a set S of clauses is S4( p)-unsatisfiable, then it admits an 
RS4( p)-refutation. 
Proof. The proof is an easy extension of the corresponding ones for S4 and left to 
the reader. The key points are as follows. 
(a) S4-trees: If 
S = {L, > . . , LIu {[klA,,a,. . > [klAt,w.}~ ~I,...., 1
u {(VP,,, 7 . , W~q~h,.kll-I.. .,p 
is a set of unit clauses, its S4( p)-projections are the sets 
S,., = {C,k,[k14.k,. , [klAn,k,,d fork = 1,. , P and i= 1,. . , %A, 
These sets are used in building S4( p) trees: in Operation 2, to any leaf we append 
a set of children which are its S4( p)-projections. Let us say that we have a k-arrow 
from w to any w,.k. 
(b) In order to build an S4( p)-mode1 out of an S4( p)-tree for some set of clauses 
S, we start with the tree structure M,, = ( W,, , T,, , m,J of Lemma 4.5. Then we write 
T,=T,u ... u T,, with Iw/ T, /MJ’~ if IwI T,, lw’l and there is a k-arrow from w to w’. 
Finally, the required mode1 is A4 = ( W, R,, . . , R,, m), where 
_ W and m are obtained from W,, and m,, by identification of “redundant” nodes, 
_ for every i = 1,. . , p, R, is the reflexive and transitive closure of T,. 
(c) The “upward lemma” is now as follows. 
4.10. Lemma. (1) [f [k]A, , . . , [k]A, t B, then B = [k]B’ for some B’, or B = 1, 
or [k]A,,. . ,[k]A,t[k]B. 
(2) !f [klA,> . . . > [ k]A, t B, and B depends on some QC in the proc$ then 
LklA,, . . , [klAn,(k)(Q,, . . , Qr)t(k)(B, Q,, . . , Qr, E) 
for some set of clauses E if B # i or 
LklA, >. > [klA,,> (k)(Q,, . . . > Qr_)tl. 
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4.3. Variants 
A number of extensions of these systems can be treated by our methods. As an 
example, we study here some extensions of epistemic logic S4( p). 
4.3.1. 
The first extension consists of S4(p) plus the following axiom schema: 
K,,: [i]A + [j]A for some fixed i and j. 
In terms of epistemic logic, this axiom can be read as “agent j knows everything 
that agent i knows”. Semantically, this corresponds to the following property on 
the accessibility relations R, and R,: R, c R,. Observe that from K,; we can derive 
the following equivalent axiom schema: 
Kc: [i]A+[j][i]A 
and thus agent j also knows that agent i knows A. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that i = 1 and j = 2. A resolution system 
for this logic is RS4(p) + the following E-rules: 
(1) 
,r(A, [l]B)+ C 
[2][ I]-rules: 
~([214 [llB)-+[2lC 
(2) 
C(L21~4, B)+ C 
~WIA, [llB)+[2lC 
(2)[ II-rule: 
,r(A, [l]B)+ C 
1((2)A, [llB)+(NA, C). 
4.11. Theorem. The above resolution system is consistent and complete. 
Proof (sketch). The consistency is obvious and proved as usual. 
In order to prove completeness, we first modify the construction of S4(p)-trees 
in the following way: in Operation 2, the projections S,,, are now 
$2 = {p,.,, [-W,,z, . . , M4n.2, LllA.,, . . , [1lAn,,I. 
The S,,,‘s are unchanged. If w is a node of type 2, then its sons w,,~ are as in the 
general case but we add l-arrows from w to the w,,~‘s. It is then immediate to check 
that the S4(p)-model built out of a nonclosed S4(p)-tree will have the property 
that Rz c R,. 
The “upward” lemma now becomes as follows. 
4.12. Lemma. Clauses (1) and (2) ofLemma 4.10, plus 
(1’) !f [k,lA,, . . , [ k,]A,, + B with the k,‘s = 1 or 2, and {f the proqf qf B depends 
on some [2]A,, then B = [2]B’, B = I, or [2] B can be proved as well. 
(2’) [f [k,]A, , . , [k,,]A,, Q, , . . , Qrk B with the k,‘s = 1 or 2, and if the proqf 
sf B depends on some Q,, then, if B # L, 
[k,lA, >. ‘2 [k,lA,, WQ, 1.. ., Qr)+(XB, Q,, . . . , Qn E) 
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,for some set of clauses E, or 
[k,lA,, . . , [knlA,> GXQ,, . . , Qr_)+l. 
The rest of the proof is as previously. n 
4.3.2. 
The next extension is-in terms of epistemic logic-to consider a (p + 1)st agent, 
call him “agent O”, who only knows things which are known by all the others. This 
agent is often known in the literature as the “fool” [19]. A corresponding axiom 
system is S4(p) plus the following axioms: 
KO,: [O]A+[i]A, forall i. 
(Agent 0 knows property A only if all the others do.) 
Semantically, the condition on the accessibility relations is L_, R,s R,,. 
Observe again that from the above axiom schema, one can derive 
[O]A+[k,][k,]. . [k,,]A forall k,, . , k,,. 
The semantical counterpart of this set of properties is (U RJ” c_ R,,, which is obvious 
from I_, R,,cR,, since R,, is transitive. For this logic we propose the following 
complete resolution system. 
Definition (The system Rfool). RS4( p) +the following rules for computing 
resolvents: 
(1) 
Z‘(A, [OILS) + C 
[k][O]-rules: 
~([klA> COlB)+ [klC 
(2) 
~(LklA, B) * C 
~([klA> COlB)+ [klC 
(k)[O]-rule: 
z(A, [OIB) + C 
I(( [OlB)+(k)(A, C) 
Example. Consider the following set of clauses: 
(1) [OI([~IAV[~IB), 
(2) iI 
(3) (3W)lB. 
A refutation will be 
(4) [3][2]B from (1) and (2), 
(5) I from (3) and (4). 
5. The resolution system for S5 
In order to define resolution for the modal system S5, the easiest way is to use 
the following facts. 
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5.1. Fact. Let F be a modal formula. There exists a formula F’ of modal degree 0 or 
1 such that i-,, F = F’. 
5.2. Fact. If F is a modal formula of degree 0 or 1, then F is S5-satisfiable ifs it is 
T-satisfiable. 
Proofs. Fact 5.1 is well known [12]. The “only-if” part of Fact 5.2 is obvious. The 
“if” part is easily obtained by transforming any T-model (W, R, m) with wg in W 
such that w,i= F, into (W, R”, m) where R* is the transitive and symmetric closure 
of R; an induction on the complexity of F shows that F still holds in wO for this 
model. n 
Another remark is that F’ of Fact 5.1 can be supposed to be in clausal form, i.e. 
a set of formulas in the following form: 
CVO D,v ... vlIlD,vOE,v ... VOE,, 
where C, D,, . . . , D, are classical clauses (no modality), and E,, . . , E, sets of 
classical clauses. 
Then we have the following procedure for testing the unsatisfiability of a formula 
F in S5: 
(1) compute F’ in clausal form, of degree G 1, such that: ks5 F = F’, 
(2) use RT do derive I from F’. 
Now, in the case of formulas of degree less than or equal to 1, we can reformulate 
RT by combining the v -rule with the other ones, and setting one distinct inference 
rule for each of these. We obtain the following system. 
Definition (The qystem RS5). It consists of the following inference rules: 
ho CvCl(lv D) C’v O(l’v D’, E) 
CvC’vO(DvD’,l’vD’,E) 
if 1 and 1’ are complementary literals, 
,,D CvO(pvD) C’v Clip v D’) 
Cv C’vU(Dv D’) 
q CvO(lv D) C’v 1’ 
CvC’vD 
if 1 and 1’ are complementary literals, 
0 
CvO(pvD,lpvD’,E) 
Cv0(DvD’,pvD,~pvD’,E) 
Clas ’ VP ” ’ lp 
cv C’ 
(classical rule): 
Fact E[D v D v Cl 
E[Dv C] 
(factoring), 
cvu I 
cl- 
c ’ 
o1 CvO(kE) 
c 
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5.3. Theorem. The system RSS is complete for refutation of sets of clauses of modal 
degree less than or equal to 1. 
The proof is immediate from the completeness of RT and the introductory remarks. 
6. Implementation of resolution 
6.1. A decision procedure 
So far we know that, given a set of clauses unsatisfiable in one of the considered 
modal systems, there exists a refutation of it using the corresponding resolution 
rules. In order to be complete, we must show how to obtain the refutation effectively. 
That is, we must produce an algorithm which, given any unsatisfiable set of 
clauses S, 
(1) will produce the empty clause. 
Moreover, if we want a decision algorithm, which is a quite natural requirement, 
this algorithm should also 
(2) detect the satisfiability of S when it is the case. 
A rough but correct algorithm to achieve goal (l), is given in Algorithm A. 
Algorithm A. Input: A set of clauses S. 
E,,: S,, := fl 
s, := s 
i:= 1 
E, : if Si c So u . . u S, ,, then FAILURE: S is satisfiable. 
if S, contains the empty clause I, then SUCCESS: S is unsatisfiable. 
E2: let S,,, be the set of all unary resolvents of clauses of S, and of all binary 
resolvents between a clause of S, and a clause of &u . . . u S,. These resolvents 
are supposed to be reduced as much as possible by the simplification rules (S,)-(S,). 
Moreover, we apply r-O-rules with the following restriction: 
E(A, B)+ C I’(A) + B 
r(O(A, B, F)) --f O(A, B, C, F) I‘(O(A, F))+O(B, A, F) 
ifC & (A, B, F). if B & (A, F). 
E,: i:=i+l 
goto El. 
Proof of the algorithm. In order to check that this algorithm is correct, we must 
first show that the step Ez (in which a set S,, , is constructed) is meaningful, i.e. 
that for every i, S,,, is finite. This is a consequence of the following lemma. 
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6.1. Lemma. For any two clauses C, and Cz, the sets R,( C,) = {D: T(C,)+ D} and 
R>(C’,, C?)={D: I(C,, C,)*D} are$nite. 
Proof. First we prove that R7( C, , C,) is finite by induction on the modal degree 
d( C,) + d( C,). If it is 0, then we are in the classical case. For the induction step, 
we observe that each of the defined rules has the form 
Z(A, B)+ C 
E(A’, B’) + C’ 
withd(A’)+d(B’)>d(A)+d(B). 
The finiteness of R,(C,) is then immediate. n 
Note that Lemma 6.1 holds even for the q O- and q iU-rules of S4 and for the 
related system of Section 4.3. 
Algorithm A certainly succeeds in generating the empty clause if the set S is 
unsatisfiable, because every possible inference will be performed. 
Decision procedure 
6.2. Proposition. In the case of systems K, Q, T and S5, Algorithm A provides a 
decision procedure. 
Proof. In this case we have a stronger result than Lemma 6.1, namely Lemma 6.3. 
6.3. Lemma. Jf Z(A,B)+C, then d(C)sMax(d(A),d(B)). IfT(C)+D, then 
d(D)sd(C). 
Proof. This can easily be seen by induction on the number of applications of the 
concerned rules. n 
Proof of Algorithm A (conclusion). Thus the algorithm will only produce clauses 
of bounded modal degree. But these are in finite number (provided we prohibit 
repetitions inside conjunctions or disjunctions, which is precisely what we do). 
Consequently, the decision procedure is correct. n 
In the case of S4 and related systems, this is not so simple, because we can 
generate clauses of increasing degree. 
Example. From 
C,=O(pv17(pvq)) G=n(lPvo(Pv4)) 
one can deduce 
~3=~(pvO(qv~(pvq)) 
and enter an infinite loop. 
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But fortunately we can bound the degree of generated formulas. Given an S4-tree 
f and a node w of t, let 
H2( w) = the maximum number of nodes of type 2 on a branch starting 
from w and leading to a leaf. 
If S is a set of clauses, let 
d(S) = max(d(C)),.,,. 
A careful inspection of the proof of Theorem 4.3 shows the following. 
6.4. Lemma. In an S4-tree for a set S of clauses, any closed node w has a refutation 
all clauses of which have a modal degree less than or equal to H2( w) + d(S). 
But the depth of type 2 of an S4-tree for S is bounded by 2card(Suh’S’) where 
Sub(S) is the set of all subformulas of S. Then we can propose the following 
algorithm for S4. 
Algorithm B. Same as Algorithm A, adding the instruction: 
MAX:= 2card’Suh’S))+ d(S) in step E,,, 
and erasing all clauses of modal degree greater than MAX in step E,. 
The question of finding a more clever way to guarantee the termination of 
Algorithm A is open for us. 
6.5. Proposition. Algorithm B is a decision procedure,for S4. 
6.2. Deletion strategies 
Algorithm A (or B) generates many useless clauses. Even much more than in the 
classical case: for instance, when we generate some D from some C by rule Rl, 
certainly C becomes useless, since t, C + D. 
Let us call a subsumption relation for a modal system .Z’, any binary relation < 
on clauses such that, for every clauses C, and C,, 
C, < Cz implies t, C, + C1 
We say that clause C, subsumes C2. 
If < is some subsumption relation, we define the following r-rule: 
sub: T(O(A, B, E))+O(A, E) if A< B. 
We can incorporate this rule into the different resolution systems; and in step E3 
of Algorithm A (or B) we can retract all subsumed clauses in S,u . . u S,. 
Obviously, the rule is sound and the algorithm is still correct, in the following sense 
that refuted sets of clauses are inconsistent. But surprisingly enough, the question 
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whether the procedure is complete is much more difficult and still open, as exposed 
in [3]. 
Now here are some possible subsumption relations: 
(1) For K, and therefore all other systems, we can use a relation recursively defined 
by 
(i) C<CvD, 
(ii) if C, < D,, . . . , C,,<D,,, then (C ,,..., C,,)<(D ,,..., D,), and 
D,v ... vD,<C,v ... vC,,, 
(iii) ifS,<S,, then (S,, S:)<S,, 
(iv) if C, ==I CZ, then 0 C, <O C,, 
(v) if S,<S,, then 0 S,<O S,. 
(2) For T we can add 
(vi) if C< D, then 0 C< D and C<O D. 
(3) And for S4, (vi) and 
(vii) if0 C<D,thenO C<O D, 
if C<O D, then 0 C<O D. 
Note that, for instance, clause (vii) blocks the loop of the above example, since 
C, subsumes C,; but we do not know if this is sufficient to ensure termination of 
the algorithm. 
7. Conclusion 
We can characterize our resolution procedure by the following two features: 
(1) the formulas considered are in clausal normal form; 
(2) the aim of our resolution rules is to eliminate elementary inconsistencies (i.e. 
the rule I(p, lp) + I must be used) in every resolution step. 
Certainly in this paper we have considered only modal propositional calculus. 
Extensions of first order logic are necessary. We must note that a first step in this 
direction has been made by Marta Cialdea [5], who has adapted our resolution 
method to the first order extension of system Q. On the other hand the extension 
to prenex formulas (modal formulas without quantifier in the scope of modal 
operators) can be easily established for compact systems by a slight modification 
of Cialdea’s work [5,6]. 
Recently other works have been developed using ideas close to those given in 
our paper. For example Abadi and Manna [I] define a resolution method for a 
large variety of propositional and first order modal logics. The first difference 
concerns the form of the formulas: in their case a normal form is not necessary. 
Second, in contrast with our approach, their method does not resolve necessarily 
an elementary inconsistency in every step of resolution. It is also less economic in 
coding information. For instance from a set {0( p v C, E) 0 1p v C’} they must first 
infer 0( p v C, 1p v C’, E) before resolving on p and lp. Also their system includes 
many inference rules, thus producing a very important search space. 
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Another connected work is that of Konolige [14]. His resolution method (like 
the tableau method) tries to reduce the inconsistency of a modal formula of degree 
n to the inconsistency of a formula whose degree is n - 1. For example from 0 (A v p) 
and lJ( B v 1~) he obtains A v p and B v lp. Then the resolution rules are recur- 
sively applied in order to obtain a set of formulas which is classically inconsistent. 
We think that our approach is closer to the spirit of classical resolution. A first 
consequence is that our procedure will generate fewer formulas, which, as one 
knows, is highly desirable. A second consequence-which has also to do with the 
use of clausal form-is our ability to define strategies. A number of “classical” 
strategies have already been extended in a natural way to the modal case such as 
negative, input, linear strategies [3]. We believe that similar results would be less 
easily obtained in the other mentioned frameworks. Another development of our 
approach is the possibility of using modal logic as a programming language, by 
restricting resolution to some class of “Horn” clauses. A first attempt in the direction 
is a system called MOLOG [2,9], an extension of Prolog that allows the mechaniz- 
ation of large variety of modal logics. 
We would like to conclude with the following remark motivated by the increasing 
interest in modal theorem proving. Establishing a general correspondence between 
axiomatics and semantics of modal systems is known to be a difficult problem. A 
great deal of theoretical work performed in the last few years made it possible to 
establish this correspondence for some classes of modal systems, and to define 
useful techniques for completeness proofs of axiomatics systems [12, 131. Now a 
related but different problem can be formulated in these two terms: 
_ elaborate general techniques for establishing the completeness of decision pro- 
cedures for modal logics 
- pinpoint classes of modal systems for which one could, given some axiomatics 
or semantics, mechanically derive a decision procedure. 
We hope the present paper has shown that resolution is a good candidate as a 
framework for achieving this goal. 
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